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Your search for William Rosenau found 22 results.

The First War on Terror
/reports/2014/the-first-war-on-terror
This paper examines the forgotten history of counterterrorism in the United States during the 1970s and early 1980s. That period was part of a long wave of terrorism that occurred across the developed world. Within the United States during that period, terrorist groups—including ethno-nationalists, separatists, and Marxist- Leninists—conducted a remarkable number of attacks, some of which resulted in significant injuries and deaths. Many of the policies, strategies, and structures designed to combat domestic terrorism during the 1970-1985 period remain part of the U.S. counterterrorism repertoire. By providing historical perspective, this paper will help today’s policymakers understand issues of change and continuity in the terrorist threat; weigh alternative approaches to countering terrorist challenges; and evaluate tradeoffs between public safety and civil liberties.
and security; and the nature of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. William Rosenau /reports/2014/crm-2014-u-008836%20%281%29.pdf /reports/2014/crm-2014-u-008836%20%281%29_Page_01.jpg
Risky Business
/reports/2014/risky-business
Since 9/11, the United States has invested billions of dollars in training and equipping foreign security forces to fight terrorist and insurgent groups abroad. Despite considerable effort and expense (including thousands of U.S. lives lost), raising military and police forces in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mali has yielded decidedly lackluster results. As a result, there is growing recognition that the application of traditional security sector reform efforts to combat asymmetric threats such as terrorist groups in fragile or failed states is proving to be slow, cumbersome, and in some instances counterproductive. Moreover, in an era of shrinking defense budgets, a purely top-down, state-centric approach has become too costly and politically contentious to sustain on a large scale.
/countering-threats-and-challenges Distribution unlimited.  106 CRM-2014-U-008881 William Rosenau Eric Davids
Israeli Nuclear Alert of 1973
/reports/2013/israeli-nuclear-alert-of-1973
Rumors of an Israeli nuclear alert in the early days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War have circulated for decades, even making their way into popular culture. The alleged alert has also informed more serious discussions about the use of nuclear weapon during international crises, and one celebrated journalist has gone so far as to assert that the Israelis used the alert to blackmail the United States to intervene aggressively in the war on Israel’s side. But did the alert really happen? In early 2012, CNA received a project award from the Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) to investigate the truth of the reports concerning the alleged alert. PASCC is funded by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).
/strategy-and-policy-analysis Cleared for public release. Specific authority: N00014-11-D-0323. 64 DRM-2013-U-004480-Final William McCants Bradley Morris William Rosenau
coming in from the cold: Terrorism in New York: The Long 1960s
/our-media/podcasts/coming-in-from-the-cold/33
When most American’s think of terrorism in New York City, they think of September 11, 2001. However, there is an entire untold history of terrorism in the city dating back decades. On today’s episode of CIFTC, Bill sits down with David Viola professor of criminology at John Jay College, who tells the story of terrorism in New York, during the long 1960s.
Center. In addition to his teaching and scholarship, Viola is a documentary filmmaker and an intelligence officer in the US Navy Reserves. William Rosenau, Ph.D , is senior policy historian at CNA
Assessment of CBSI Partner Nation Capabilities for Maritime Security and Law Enforcement
/reports/2022/08/assessment-of-cbsi-partner-nation-capabilities-for-maritime-security-and-law-enforcement
CNA assessed the current maritime security and law enforcement capabilities of the for twelve of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CNSI) partner nations: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago; as well as two Caribbean cooperative security institutions: CARICOM IMPACS and the Regional Security System. These assessments are concise snapshots of partner capabilities relevant to the goals of INL CBSI as of March 2022.
/countering-threats-and-challenges .Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. This work was performed under Federal Government Contract No. N00014-22-D-7001. 186 DRM-2022-U-032004-Final William Rosenau Veronica De Allende Zack Gold
Racial Extremism in the Military
/reports/2021/11/racial-extremism-in-the-military
Before and after January 6, 2021, a series of reports called attention to the potential threat posed by extremists in the military.
for public release. Unlimited distribution 72 CRM-2021-U-030885-Final Pamela G. Faber Kaia Haney With contributions by William Rosenau and Alexander Powell
The Psychology of Disinformation Case Studies
/reports/2021/10/the-psychology-of-disinformation-case-studies
The absorption and spread of disinformation is a pervasive phenomenon across a wide variety of topics and media. Most disinformation research focuses on the source (who created it?) and the environment in which it exists (what platform/medium transmits the information?). Recognizing that disinformation primarily works in an individual person’s mind, this report describes four normal, routine psychological mechanisms that are associated with the absorption and spread of disinformation. We then describe real-world case studies—focusing on activities linked to COVID-19, and to campaigns coordinated by US adversaries including Russia, China, and Iran—to illustrate the way these mechanisms can be manipulated to aid the spread disinformation. The report concludes with multi-pronged recommendations that DOD can use to address the vulnerabilities associated with these psychological mechanisms so as prevent the spread of disinformation and protect both US servicemembers and the country.
/reports/2021/10/PsychologyofDisinfoPageImage.jpg Countering Threats and Challenges DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited 72 DRM-2021-U-030881-Final Kaia Haney William Rosenau With contributions by Neil Carey and Kasey Stricklin
Right Wing Extremism in US Law Enforcement
/reports/2021/04/right-wing-extremism-in-us-law-enforcement
This paper provides an overview of the current state of knowledge about police officer engagement in rightwing extremism, including the sustained use of racist, misogynistic, and homophobic language and stereotyping, both online and offline. After surveying the contemporary right-wing extremist landscape, this paper uses publicly available sources to explore in a preliminary way aspects of extremist penetration and recruitment, pre-employment screening challenges, police participation in extremist activity, and the role of social media platforms and the internet in enabling extremism. The paper concludes with a set of analytical questions that practitioners and policy-makers must answer if they hope to mitigate the rightwing extremist threat.
extremist threat.  William Rosenau Megan McBride /reports/2021/04/what-we-know-and-what-we-dont-know-about-the-presence-of-right-wing-extremism-in-law-enforcement.pdf /reports/2021/04
Understanding Gender and Violent
/reports/2021/04/understanding-gender-and-violent
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict – Stability and Humanitarian Affairs (OASD (SO/LIC-SHA)) asked CNA to study the role of women and gender in both violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and US counterterrorism (CT) and counter violent extremism (CVE) operations (hereafter CT/CVE). Our research demonstrates that the dominant stereotypes about women’s roles in VEOs miss the vast majority of female activity in these groups and fundamentally fail to capture women’s lived experiences. Despite the passage of Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) legislation in the US, we found that internal DOD activities that are truly gender considered are severely limited, lack nuance, and are not institutionalized. External US CT/CVE efforts do not consider the roles men or women play from a nuanced perspective, and they are disproportionately influenced by a set of gender stereotypes that shape expectations of men and women’s roles. Much of the current DOD approach can be traced to misunderstanding gender as a concept. This report provides an analysis of the gaps, risks, and opportunities for the Department of Defense (DOD) on understanding women and gender in extremism, and integrating a gender considered approach to CT/CVE.
/Gender-VEPageImage.jpg Countering Threats and Challenges DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. 232 DRM-2021-U-029105-1Rev Julia McQuaid Emily Mushen Alexander Powell William G. Rosenau Elizabeth Yang
Proxy Warfare
/reports/2019/07/proxy-warfare
Proxy warfare—that is, conflict in which a “major power instigates or plays a major role in supporting and directing to a conflict but does only a small portion of the actual fighting itself”—is receiving new attention from policymakers, analysts, and practitioners. This study uses a series of four case studies on US involvement in proxy war (the “Secret War” in Laos, the Contras in Central America, the African Union Mission in Somalia, and the Syrian Defense Forces) to develop a set of key themes. These themes, in turn, form the basis of a set of rules of thumb to guide senior decisionmakers as they contemplate the future use of proxy forces. Finally, this report discusses implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces, which are likely to play an increasingly important role in supporting U.S. proxies.
and adversaries. Cast in that light, it is our hope that these rules of thumb will help the US to most effectively employ proxy forces in the future. William Rosenau Zack Gold /reports/2019/07